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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH SANTINA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
14818

-vsDELMAR LARSEN,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTSTATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Joseph Santina, petitioned the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, for a writ of habeas corpus based upon his
allegation that the extradition documents demanding his
return to Illinois were insufficient to sustain the
requested extradition (R.2,3).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was denied by the Third Judicial District Court on September
30, 1976, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. Judge,
presiding ( R. 7) •
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that this Court affirm the
decision of the lower court and expedite Illinois'
extradition request.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Santina was charged by indictment
on December 23, 1973, with the crimes of failure to
appear and criminal conspiracy in the State of Illinois.
On April 1, 1976, the appellant was arrested, booked, and
incarcerated in the Salt Lake County

J~il

and, on

April 7, 1976, he was charged with the crime of being a
fugitive from justice in the State of Utah.

On May 19,

1977, the Utah Governor's Office received extradition
papers for appellant from the State of Illinois.
On June 30, 1976, counsel for appellant
petitioned the Third Judicial District Court, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for a writ of
habeas corpus alleging, inter alia, that the documents
demanding petitioner's extradition to Illinois were
substantively lacking and not in proper form as
prescribed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3 (1953)
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(R.2,3).
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On September 30, 1976, petitioner's writ was
argued by counsel for petitioner and counsel for respondent
before Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr.

(R.7).

Said

petition was denied by Judge Hanson, Sr., and petitioner
was ordered extradited as soon as possible (R.7).
On October 14, 1976, petitioner filed a notice
of appeal with this Court (R.8).

On March 31, 1977, the

Supreme Court Clerk send appellant's attorney a notice
of default.

Subsequently, on April 28, 1977, this Court

granted appellant an extension of time until May 31, 1977,
to file his brief on appeal.

Failing to proceed with this

appeal, the Supreme Court Clerk sent a second notice of
default to counsel for appellant on June 24, 1977.

On

August 4, 1977, counsel for respondent submitted a motion
to dismiss for failure to prosecute based upon the above
mentioned facts.

On August 12, 1977, this Court granted

appellant's counsel until August 18, 1977, to file a brief
with this Court, under penalty of dismissal.
Appellant's brief was submitted on August 19,
1977, challenging the disposition of the petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the lower court.

Presently,

Illinois is still awaiting the the extradition of the
fugitive which they originally sought on May 19, 1976.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE GOVERNOR OF UTAH SHALL RECOGNIZE A DEMAND FOR
EXTRADITION FROM A DEMANDING STATE WHERE THE EXTRADITION
DOCUMENTS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPORT WITH THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN.§ 77-56-3 (1953).
Appellant argues that the lower court erred in
not finding that the extradition documents from the
demanding state did not comply with the statutory requirements set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3 (1953), that
there is no evidence to support an arrest warrant by the
Governor of Utah, and therefore, that the appellant was
unlawfully deprived of his liberty by the State of Utah.
Respondent asserts that the documents of the
demanding state complied with Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3 (1953),
in every essential part.
Before the Governor of the State of Utah can
issue an arrest warrant for a fugitive requested by a
demanding state, Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3 (1953), requires
that the demanding state present documents of a specific
form and substance.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3 (1953),

states:
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"No demand for the extradition
of a person charged with crime in
another state shall be recognized by
the governor unless in writing
alleging, except in cases arising
under section 77-56-6, that the accused
was present in the demanding state at
the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, and that thereafter he fled from
the state, and accompanied by a copy
of an indictment found or by information
supported by affidavit in the state
having jurisdiction of the crime, or by
a copy of an affidavit made before a
magistrate there, together with a copy
of any warrant which was issued thereupon
or by a copy of a judgment of conviction or
of a sentence composed in execution,
together with a statement by the executive
authority of the demanding state that the
person claimed has escaped from confinement
or has broken the terms of his bail,
probation or parole. The indictment,
information or affidavit made before the
magistrate must substantially charge the
person demanded with having committed a crime
under the !Aw of that state and the copy of
indictment, information, affidavit, judgment
of conviction or sentence must be authenticated
by the executive authority making the demand."
Once the Governor determines that the request of the
demanding state sufficiently meets the requirements of Utah Code
Ann.

§

77-56-3 (1953), he may then sign a warrant for the arrest

of the fugitive.

Utah Code Ann.

§

77-56-7 (1953).

In the instant case, the documents from the demanding
state were clearly sufficient to justify execution of an
arrest warrant by the Governor of Utah.
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The documents presented by the State of Illinois
state that appellant Santina was in Illinois at the time
of the corn.mission of the crimes of calculated criminal drug
conspiracy, unlawful delivery of a controlled substance,
unlawful delivery of cannabis, and unlawful possession of
cannabis.

It is further stated by the Governor of Illinois

that appellant Santina thereafter fled from Illinois and
took refuge in the State of Utah.
The extradition papers contain a Bill of Indictment, filed in the Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial
Circuit, Will County, State of Illinois, by a Grand Jury
charging appellant with the commission of the above mentioned
crimes.

The extradition documents further contain a Criminal

Capias (bench warrant) commanding the sheriff of Will County,
State of Illinois, to take appellant into custody.

The

attached affidavit of Keith Kostelny, Deputy Sheriff,
Will County, states that appellant Santina made bail in
the amount of $30,000, but on September 30, 1974, failed to
appear for trial, thus violating the terms of his bail agreeme:
Finally, the request by the Governor of Illinois
states that appellant Santina stands charged with the above
mentioned crimes under the laws of Illinois.

The Governor's

requisition concludes by authenticating all the papers
and documents annexed to his extradition request.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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l

Each essential document and needed recital was
set forth in the request from the demanding state, fulfil1ing
the terms of Utah Code Ann.

§

77-56-3 (1953), and a1lowing

the Governor to sign an arrest warrant for the extradition
of appellant.
Respondent notes that appellant's brief fails to
allege those particulars he feels are lacking in the extradition documents of the demanding state.
§

Utah Code Ann.

77-56-3 (1953), sets forth the precise documentary

requ~re

rnents for extradition; providing various alternatives for
escapees, and bail bond, probation,

a~

parole violators.

Each specific circumstance requires a different form of
documentation.

In the instant case, the extradition papers

of the demanding state contain documentation sufficient for
the return of a bail bond violator--appellant's current
status.

Appellant cites Little v. Beckstead, 11 Utah 2d 270,

358 P.2d 93 (1961), as requiring additional documentation
not contained in the papers of the demanding state.
Respondent notes that Little dealt with the return of a
fugitive to Oregon after the completion of a term in the
Utah State Prison.

Little had been previously convicted of

burglary and forgery in Oregon and had fled the state pending
the outcome of an appeal.

Thus, the two cases are factual1y

-7-
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dissimilar and require different extradition documentation.
Finally, respondent notes that the extradition
papers of the demanding state sufficiently comply with
Illinois Annotated Statutes 60 § 40, which statute is identic.
to Utah Code Ann.§ 77-56-23 (1953), which requires:
"When the return to this state of
a person charged with crime in this
state is required the prosecuting attorney
shall present to the governor his written
application for a requisition
for the return of the person charged, in
which application shall be stated the name
of the person so charged, the crime
charged against him, the approximate time,
place and circumstances""of its commission,
the state in which he is believed to be,
including the location of the accused
therein at the time the application is
made, and certifying that in the opinion
of the said prosecuting attorney the ends
of justice require the arrest and return
of the accused to this state for trial and
that the proceeding is not instituted to
enforce a private claim.
(b) When the return to this state is
required of a person who has been convicted
of a crime in this state and has escaped
from confinement or broken the terms of
his bail, probation or parole the prosecuting
attorney of the county in which the offense
was committed, the parole board, or the
warden of the institution or sheriff of the
county from which escape was made shall present
to the governor a written application for a
requisition for the return of such person,
in which application shall be stated the name
of the person, the crime of which he was
convicted, the circumstances of his escape
from confinement, or of the breach of the
terms of his bail, probation or parole, t~
state in which he is believed to be,
including the location of the person therein
at the time application is made.
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(c) The application shall be verified
by affidavit, shall be executed in duplicat~,
and shall be accompanied by two certified
copies of the indictment returned, or
information and affidavit filed, or of the
complaint made to the judge or magistrate
stating the offense with which the accused
is charged, or of the judgment or conviction,
or of the sentence. The prosecuting officer,
parole board, warden, or sheriff may also
attach such further affidavits and other
documents in duplicate as he shall deem
proper to be submitted with such application.
One copy of the application with the action
of the governor indicated by endorsement
thereon and one of the certified copies of
the indictment, complaint, information and
affidavits or of the ju~gment of conviction
or of the sentence shalf be filed in the
office of the secretary of state to remain
of record in that off ice. The other
copies of all papers shall be forwarded with
the governor's requisition."
Thus, had the extradition papers of the demanding state

be~n

prepared by Utah authorities for the extradition of a
similar fugitive, they would have sufficiently complied with
Utah law.
It is clear that the above mentioned extradition
request substantially comports with all the requirements of
Utah Code Ann.

§

77-56-3 (1953).
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POINT II
FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO FILE FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Appellant alleges that counsel for the State
failed to file findings of fact or conclusions of law
after his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
denied and contends that he was substantially prejudiced
thereby.
First, respondent notes that appellant has mistaken:
placed the blame for the failure to fibe findings of fact
and conclusions of law upon counsel for the State.

It is

not respondent's duty to make and file such findings and
conclusions, but the duty of the trial court Harmon v.
Rasmussen,

13 Utah 2d 422, 375 P.2d 762 (1962), LeGrand

Johnson Corp.v. Peterson, 18 Utah2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 (1966).
Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1953), provides:
"In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the court shall, unless the same was waived,
find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon and direct
the entry of the appropriate judgment~ and
in granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions
of law which constitute the grounds of its
action.
Requests for findings are not
necessary for purposes of review. The
-10-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

findings of a master to the extent that
the court adopts them, shall be considered
as the findings of the court. Findings
of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under
Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except
as provided in Rule 4l(b)." (Emphasis
added)
Next, respondent asserts that the trial court's
failure to make and file such findings and conclusions is,
at best, harmless error and does not constitute
reversible error.
Rule 61, Rules of Civil Procedure

(195~),

provides:
"No error in either the"' admission or
the exclusion of evidence, and no error
or defect in any ruling or order or in
anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties, is ground for
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal
to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice.
The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect
in the proceeding which does not affect
the substantial rights of the parties~
(Emphasis added)
This "substantial rights" test has been consistently
followed in our decisional law.

In Ortega v. Thomas, 14

Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963), this Court considered
alleged errors in jury instructions and improper cormnents
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by the trial court concerning the evidence presented
at trial.

Finding no reversible error and citing Rule

61, this court stated:
"In order to justify reversal, the
appellant must show error that was substantial and prejudicial in the sense
there is at least a reasonable likelihood
that in the absense of the error the
result would have been different."
383 P.2d at 408.
Thus, for appellant to prevail on appeal, he
must show that the trial court's failure to file findings
of fact and conclusions of law was such prejudicial error
that "there is at least a reasonable 1..,1-kelihood" that,
excluding such an error, the result would have been
different.

Clearly appellant cannot show such.

Even if

the trial court had filed findings and conclusions, its
decision denying appellant's petition could have in no
way been altered or changed.

Therefore, failure to file

findings of fact and conclusions of law aoes not
constitute substantial and prejudicial error mandating
reversal.

This court's previous pronouncements regarding

the above-discussed error affirm this principle.
In Snyder v. Allen, 51 U. 291, 169 P. 945
(1917), the trial court failed to make findings upon
material issues presented by defendant's answer and
counterclaim.

This court held that:
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" ... while the failure of the trial
court to find upon all the material
issues presented by the pleadings was
clearly error, the error, as we view
the record before us, did not affect
any substantial right of the defendants,
and this court will not reverse the
judgment where the error thus excepted
to and complained of resulted in no
prejudice to the defendants." 169 P.
at 945.
In Petty v. St. George Garage Co., 60 U.
126, 206 P. 720 (1922); In re Love's Estate, 75 U. 342,
285 P. 299

(1930); and Ellison v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d

374, 423 P.2d 657

(1967), this court was again faced with

the problem of omitted findings and

co~clusions.

In

each instance, this Court affirmed its ruling in Snyder

v. Allen, supra.
Therefore, the trial court's failure to file
findings of fact and conclusions of law was not prejudicial to appellant and cannot constitute error of such
a nature that reversal is required.
When reviewing a case where findings of fact and
conclusions of law have been omitted, this court will assume
facts in accordance with the decision of the lower court.
In Mower v. McCarthy, 122 u. ·l, 245 P.2d 224 (1952), this
Court ruled:
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"In reviewing a case of this kind
where issues of fact are involved and there
are no findings of fact, we do not review
the facts but assume that the trier of the
facts found them in accord with its
decision, and we affirm the decision if
from the evidence it would be reasonable
to find facts to support it.
See Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49{a).
This is the same procedure which is
followed where a jury returns a general
verdict without disclosing its findings
on the facts, and in administrative
agency cases where findings of fact
are not required, but we cannot review
the facts."245 P.2d at 226.
In the instant case, the lower court denied
appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

(R.7).

Respondent admitted petitioner's alleg~tion numbers one
(1) and three (3) and denied allegation number two (2)
(R.4).

Petitioner's allegation number two (2) contended

that the extradition papers of the demanding state did
not comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. S
77-56-3 (1953)

(R.2).

Obviously, when the trial court

denied petitioner's writ, it decided only issue number
two (2) and must have necessarily decided that the
extradition docwnents of the demanding state complied
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3 (1953).
Respondent asserts, therefore, that in accordance
with the rule announced in Mower v. McCarthy, supra, this
Court should assume that the trial judge found the
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•

extradition documents to be sufficient, in accordance
with his decision, and affirm the decision of the lower
court.
CONCLUSION
Respondent contends that an examination of
the extradition papers of the demanding state reveals
that said documents comply in every respect with the
statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3
(1953), and justify the issuance of a Governor's
Warrant by the Governor of Utah for the return of the
fugitive to the demanding state.

~

Respondent also contends that the failure of
the trial court to make and file findings of fact and
conclusions of law is, at best, harmless error and
cannot be considered reversible error.
Finally, due to the numerous delays with
respect to this extradition, including the notices of
default and the extensions connected with this appeal,
respondent urges this Court to expedite ruling on the
appeal and permit the fugitive appellant to be returned

-15-
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to the demanding state forthwith.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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